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Since summer 2014, the drop in world oil prices has left holes in the budgets 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Thus, in addition to priva-
tising state-owned enterprises, these governments plan to introduce taxa-
tion for the first time ever. From the beginning of 2018, a value added tax 
of 5 per cent will be levied in all six Gulf monarchies. However, systematic 
taxation has far-reaching consequences: in the Gulf, for instance, citizens 
have hitherto enjoyed tax exemption and high subsidies but could demand 
political participation as taxpayers. The G20’s influence on these reforms is 
above all symbolic in nature.
 • Even optimistic predictions do not anticipate the price of oil returning to the 
level of USD 110 per barrel, which it reached in June 2014. That presents the oil 
monarchies in the Gulf with enormous challenges. The majority of them spend 
far more than they earn through the sale of hydrocarbon products.
 • Up to now, the Gulf States have reacted to their growing budget deficits by cut-
ting spending, falling back on financial reserves, reforming taxes, and privatis-
ing state-owned enterprises.
 • Taxation requires a reciprocal relationship between a government and its citi-
zens, but the expansion of representative institutions is not a real political op-
tion in the Gulf. Instead, the oil-rich authoritarian monarchies will attempt to 
develop other forms of governance services – such as, enhanced digitalisation, 
the creation of friend–foe schemes, and the accentuation of the global exclusivity 
of their own citizens.
Policy Implications
As the most influential member within the GCC and the only absolute monarchy 
within the G20, Saudi Arabia will assertively canvass support from among the 
20 most powerful countries in the world for its planned structural reforms. How-
ever, any support for Saudi reform and regional policy at the G20 summit in 
Germany in July 2017 should depend on its policies meeting two requirements: 
respect for the fundamental principles of human rights and international law 
and the integrative involvement of all relevant states in the region.
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The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are currently fac-
ing far-reaching economic and political challenges. The long-term prospects for the 
world energy markets mean that a differentiation of the state revenues systems in 
the Gulf is urgently required, as these systems are exclusively based on the hydro-
carbon sector. In addition to higher rates of debt – which will soon be inevitable 
in financing a transition phase – tax system reform will have to play a key role 
in ensuring fiscal stability. Thus, it should be a G20 objective to support the GCC 
member states, which are of key importance for the stability of the Middle East, to 
successfully implement their pending structural reforms.
However, such support should not be given at any price. As the most influential 
actor in the GCC and as a member of the G20, Saudi Arabia will use the opportunity 
of the G20 summit in Hamburg in July to not only promote its reform proposals but 
also intensely search for investors from among the world’s largest economies for its 
ambitious privatisation programme. Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy, has come 
to understand that in a globalised world authoritarian leaders depend on accept-
ance and allies. Next to investment capital, regional stability represents the most 
important commodity – something the Gulf States, headed by Saudi Arabia, can 
offer. The influence of the G20 on the Gulf monarchies concrete reform proposals 
will, however, be limited. Nevertheless, the G20 must continue to demand compli-
ance with fundamental human rights and international law as well as the involve-
ment of all regional powers. Both elements are essential to the success of structural 
reforms within the framework of future GCC regional and adaptation policies.
The Decline in World Oil Prices since 2014 and the  
Fiscal Consequences for the Gulf Monarchies
on 23 June 2014 a barrel of crude oil (about 159 litres) was still being traded at a 
price of USD 111.18 at the futures exchange in Dubai. By the end of the 2014, the 
price had dropped to USD 53.76 per barrel – meaning that the most important 
income source of the six GCC member states had seen its value halved in just six 
months. Since then, the price of oil has levelled out at an average price of around 
USD 50 per barrel (see figure 1). This development has had wide-reaching eco-
nomic, social, and possibly even political consequences for the authoritarian Gulf 
monarchies.
Figure 1
 Oil Price Develop-
ment, 2002–2017  
Average Annual 
Price)
Source: OPEC Refer-
ence Basket (ORB), www.
opec.org/opec_web/en/
data_graphs/40.htm  
(16 May 2017)
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All GCC member states greatly profited from rising oil prices that began during the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The high oil prices between 
2010 and mid-2014 were historic. As a result, high surpluses benefitted the national 
budget, and growth figures were markedly good. Many governments began to invest 
heavily in infrastructure and prestige projects. They were also able to build up their 
foreign exchange reserves, and many Gulf States arranged global investments. But 
as a consequence of the Arab Spring, the costs of subsidies and the public sector 
have increased since 2011. Because the majority of citizens in the Gulf monarchies 
are employed in the public sector, their salaries were increased, and new positions 
were created within the security sector and the state bureaucracy. The goal was 
to provide the younger generation of citizens with employment and decent wages 
(lucas und Richter 2012). The elites also wanted to avoid mass protests against the 
authoritarian regimes – similar to those that occurred in Tunisia in December 2010 
and in Egypt and Bahrain in January 2011 – by all means. Without the high revenue 
generated by the sale of hydrocarbon products, the authoritarian Gulf monarchies 
would not have survived the Arab Spring so easily. With the exception of Bahrain, 
they mostly (apart from short-lived or specific minority-led protests in Kuwait, 
 Saudi Arabia, and oman) or completely, as in the case of Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), escaped the impacts of the Arab Spring.
The beginning of the drop in oil prices in the summer of 2014 [1]  hit the six GCC 
countries during a politically sensitive situation. The weight of the fiscal burden 
that was incurred is illustrated in table 1 by the countries’ respective break-even 
oil prices – a notional price on which the national budget is theoretically balanced.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 20171
Bahrain 110,7 119,4 130,4 103,3 118,7 105,7 101,1
Kuwait 42,5 49,0 42,5 54,5 47,2 46,5 49,1
oman 77,9 79,8 98,3 94,0 100,3 80,1 79,2
Qatar 79,0 63,1 61,9 56,2 53,5 54,6 52,9
Saudi Arabia 78,1 77,9 89,0 105,7 93,8 93,7 83,8
UAE 93,3 69,9 69,4 79,0 58,8 58,6 67,0
Average oil price (oRB) 107,46 109,45 105,87 96,29 49,49 40,76 51,38
1= Estimated value.
Since 2014, the break-even oil prices for Bahrain, oman, and Saudi Arabia have far 
surpassed the actual oil price. Despite the introduction of effective saving measures 
(no later than in 2015), this difference is still visible in all three countries. Even the 
UAE and Qatar were forced to take a series of measures to adjust their break-even 
oil prices to the actual price. Only Kuwait, due to its extraordinarily high produc-
tion volume per capita, did not have to take on any debt despite an oil price level of 
around USD 50 per barrel. The consequences thereof can be seen in the budget bal-
ance, debt ratio, and foreign exchange reserve figures as a percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) (see table 2).
Table 1
Break-Even Oil Prices 
in USD/Barrel
Source: International 
Monetary Fund; www.
opec.org/opec_web/en/
data_graphs/40.htm 
(15 May 2017)
1 Meanwhile, the majority 
of experts believe that the 
causes of this sharp de-
cline can be found in a mix 
of global over-production, 
on the one hand, and the 
slowdown in economic 
growth – particularly in 
China and India – on the 
other hand.
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2014 2015 2016 20171
Bahrain
Budget balance -1,6 % -18,4 % -17,7 % -12,2 %
Debt ratio 44,4 % 66,0 % 82,1 % 88,6 %
Foreign exchange reserves 18,12 % 10,88 % 8,82 % 7,51 %
Kuwait
Budget balance 27,1 % 1,2 % -3,6 % 3,5 %
Debt ratio 7,5 % 11,2 % 18,6 % 19,8 %
Foreign exchange reserves 19,81 % 24,88 % 28,55 % 25,64 %
oman
Budget balance -1,1 % -15,1 % -20,6 % -10,1 %
Debt ratio 4,9 % 15,3 % 34,3 % 38,5 %
Foreign exchange reserves 20,14 % 25,12 % 29,59 % 28,19 %
Qatar
Budget balance 15,3 % 5,6 % -4,1 % -3,1 %
Debt ratio 32,3 % 34,9 % 47,6 % 50,2 %
Foreign exchange reserves 21,01 % 22,63 % 21,33 % 18,30 %
Saudi Arabia
Budget balance -3,4 % -15,8 % -16,9 % -9,8 %
Debt ratio 1,6 % 5,0 % 12,4 % 15,6 %
Foreign exchange reserves 96,82 % 94,57 % 72,53 % 77,41 %
UAE
Budget balance 5,0 % -2,1 % -3,9 % -2,6 %
Debt ratio 15,6 % 18,1 % 19,3 % 19,1 %
Foreign exchange reserves 19,51 % 25,37 % 24,60 % 22,35 
1= Estimated value.
In Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait the discrepancy between state revenue and expendi-
ture has remained at a relatively low, negative level. In fact, Kuwait is expecting 
a small budget surplus for 2017. In the UAE and Kuwait the debt ratio is small, 
whereas in Qatar it is around 50 per cent of GDP. All three countries have sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves to provide them with a degree of room for manoeuvre 
in relation to the budget deficit. In contrast, since 2015, the budgets of Bahrain, 
Oman, and Saudi Arabia have exhibited a high deficit of over 10 per cent of GDP; 
though this development is proceeding most dramatically in Bahrain. Along with 
the country’s perpetually high budget deficit, the debt ratio has increased to over 
80 per cent of GDP. At the same time, foreign exchange reserves have melted away 
since 2014. Based on current levels, Bahrain can no longer cover its budget gap with 
reserves it has available. Although Oman has had a budget deficit similar to that of 
Bahrain since 2014, the structural conditions in the sultanate have proven more 
advantageous. There, the debt ratio is rather low at around 35 per cent, and for-
eign exchange reserves account for about a third of current GDP. In contrast, Saudi 
Arabia represents a special case: even though its budget deficit was over 15 per 
cent in both 2015 and 2016, its debt ratio was registered as being the lowest of all 
the GCC members. In addition, during the oil-price boom, Saudi Arabia stockpiled 
historically large foreign exchange reserves, which will enable it to offset its current 
budget deficit level over a number of years. 
For the GCC states, there are – in principle – three ways to react to the sinking 
world oil price: 
1. Stabilise oil prices, which would ideally lead to a new hike 
2. Reduce government spending parallel to decreasing government revenue 
3. Fill the budget gap in the national budget by raising and implementing alterna-
tive revenue sources.
Table 2
 Budget Balance, Debt 
Ratio, and Foreign 
Exchange Reserves as 
% of GDP
Source: International 
Monetary Fund (budget 
balance and debt ratio) 
and the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (foreign 
exchange reserves).
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Stabilising the Oil Price
For the authoritarian Gulf monarchies, influencing oil prices so that they climb 
back to a higher level is an attractive target. Increased state revenues could ease 
the pressure for reform in the respective societies. However, influencing crude oil 
prices in the international market is a complex task, if not an impossible one. In 
such a case, Saudi Arabia would take on a central role due to its traditional function 
as the global swing-producer.
Since summer 2014, Saudi policy has seemingly been focused on riding out the 
threatening low-price phase in the oil market. Up to the death of King Abdullah in 
January 2015, Saudi Arabia had made no serious efforts to soften or even impede 
the decline in oil prices. Following the 166th oPEC Meeting in Vienna in November 
2014, no production cuts were announced. on the contrary, oPEC members – with 
Saudi Arabia at the head – expanded production. In this initial phase, Riyadh was 
more concerned with defending its market share in the global oil market and, indi-
rectly, the shares of the other GCC members (Claes et al. 2015). Following King Sal-
man's succession to the throne and his decision to rearrange the line of succession 
in favour of his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef (crown prince) and his favourite son 
Mohammed bin Salman (deputy crown prince), Saudi Arabia's strategy with regard 
to world oil prices began to change. However, it was not until the beginning of 2016 
that any publicly discernible efforts were made to stabilise the threat of continued 
drops in oil prices through collective action by the oil producers. Not least because 
of the ever-increasing rivalry between the Saudi royal family and the Iranian lead-
ership, an agreement between the oil producers was delayed until the end of 2016. 
At the 171st oPEC Meeting in November 2016, a six-month restriction on produc-
tion was announced for the first time; days later, 11 non-OPEC countries, including 
Russia, followed suit (MEES 2017). As a result, oil prices went up by a few dollars 
per barrel. A nine-month extension of the agreement (until March 2018) was an-
nounced in May 2017.
However, whether this agreement will serve as an impulse for a long-term in-
crease in oil prices far in excess of USD 50 per barrel is questionable. The main 
reason for this lies with the adaptability of the unconventional oil industry, which 
extracts hydrocarbon products through fracking mainly in the United States and in-
creasingly in other world regions. Even experts have been surprised at how quickly 
companies operating in the US market have succeeded in reducing their production 
costs since 2014. This segment of the world market already started to increase its 
production volume in autumn 2016 (Mahdi et al. 2017). Currently, the unconven-
tional oil industry in the United States can make a profit while producing at a level 
of USD 43–USD 45 per barrel (AFP 2017). Due to its almost exclusively private 
ownership structure, this segment of the world market is unlikely to be integrated 
into the new, state enterprise–dominated cartel, oPEC Plus.
long-term, there have been a number of additional developments that make it 
unlikely that oil prices will return to summer 2014 levels. This includes the trend 
towards e-mobility in several industrialised countries and the political goal to ex-
pand renewable energy in Germany, in particular, and several other Western Eu-
ropean countries. Thanks to global climate protection efforts (UN Climate Confer-
ence, Paris, 2015), there is a worldwide trend towards decarbonisation – that is, 
the significant reduction of carbon emissions, which will be unstoppable in the long 
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run. Consequently, the GCC countries’ efforts to bring about a significant rise in the 
price of oil represent a drop in the ocean and are very likely to fail in the medium 
term.
National Adaptation Strategies for Sinking Oil Prices
In contrast to the efforts to influence world oil prices, measures that target a reduc-
tion in expenditure and the development of new state revenues are more realistic 
options for the Gulf monarchies. Although the experiences of previous low-price 
phases have shown that cuts to state benefits are likely to prompt social opposition, 
national adaption strategies – in comparison to international policies – have the 
clear advantage of enabling the respective state to deal with this using its own scope 
for action. The majority of GCC countries recognised this scope and introduced a 
number of reforms.
Simply put, due to the decline in oil prices, the following adjustments have been 
made since 2015:
 • Investments in infrastructural and prestige projects have been postponed or 
adjusted
 • Fuel, water, and energy subsidies and other public services have been cancelled
 • Existing taxes and fees have been expanded and/or increased
 • States have engaged in new borrowing in national and international credit markets.
 • State-owned enterprises have been privatised
 • Existing forms of taxation have been reformed and new ones have been introduced.
The specific mix of these political measures varies from country to country, but 
they arise out of the following country-specific aspects: the level of oil revenues and 
the national debt, the commitment to reform of central decision-makers, and the 
degree of social polarisation.
A first fiscal measure has been to reduce investments in initiated large-scale 
projects or to defer the start of new projects – both of which can be implemented 
without sparking public opposition. Notable examples are the postponement of the 
GCC-wide rail network, the delay to construction of the culture and tourism island 
(Saadiyat) in Abu Dhabi, and the sluggish progress in completing the King Abdul-
lah financial district in Riyadh. A second measure, which was relatively quickly an-
nounced during 2015 and implemented in all GCC member states by 2016, was the 
marked reduction in fuel, energy, and water subsidies. For instance, having previ-
ously had some of the lowest petrol prices worldwide, Kuwait raised the price of 
petrol in 2015 and 2016 by over 100 per cent; Saudi Arabia, by up to 200 per cent 
(Krane and Hung 2016). A third measure has seen many Gulf monarchies not only 
borrow within national banking systems but also sell government bonds in interna-
tional capital markets for the first time in decades. A fourth measure saw plans to 
privatise state-owned enterprises made public. The most prominent example, which 
occurred in the context of the Saudi reform programme Vision 2030, was the publi-
cation on the plan to make 5 per cent of the Saudi oil giant Aramco available to in-
ternational investors. There are also concrete plans in oman (oman oil Company), 
the UAE (Emirates Global Aluminium), and Kuwait (Az-Zour North Independent 
Water & Power Project) to privatise state-owned enterprises, at least partially. As a 
fifth measure, the governments of all six GCC members have raised fees for public 
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services, though these by and large exclusively apply to migrant workers. However, 
several states are even considering introducing new duties and taxes – which, for 
the Gulf monarchies, would be equivalent to a revolution. In December 2016 it was 
announced that a uniform value added tax of 5 per cent would be implemented 
across all GCC states from 1 January 2018. So far, oman is the only GCC country 
to have additionally increased company taxation (from 13 per cent to 15 per cent) 
and introduced a tax rate for micro-enterprises (3 per cent). Both measures are also 
to be implemented on 1 January 2018. Until now, individual income taxation has 
been categorically ruled out, especially in Saudi Arabia. However, there have been 
discussions even in Riyadh about the introduction of additional taxes and duties.
The Need for Tax Reform and Its Consequences
Apart from the payment of zakat – the mandatory contribution in Islam to those 
in need – there is no taxation on personal income, assets, or corporate gains in the 
authoritarian Gulf monarchies. outside of the hydrocarbon sector, only foreign-
owned businesses are levied with a 10 per cent–20 per cent tax on profits made. 
And only for oil and gas companies is there uniform corporate taxation (with the 
exception of oman, which uses more general corporate taxation) which does not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign owners. Save for imports (which are sub-
ject to a GCC uniform duty rate of 5 per cent), as a general rule no form of goods 
movement or goods production is taxed (IMF 2016) – though a few exceptions ap-
ply to the tourism sector. As a result, the Gulf monarchies have to date served as 
unique tax havens, whose exclusivity for their respective citizens is under threat due 
to the drop in oil prices.
Because world oil prices are unlikely to climb back up to the summer 2014 level, 
it is essential – from a fiscal perspective – that the GCC member states are able to 
fall back on a source of income independent of hydrocarbon production in order 
to be able to maintain existing levels of government expenditure. Should the cor-
responding reform not succeed, there would likely be a phase of rising debt with an 
uncertain outcome for each country’s economic development and social cohesion. 
Therefore, in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, the reform and introduction of tax 
systems is currently being discussed within the Arab Gulf monarchies. 
The concept of taxation, as it developed particularly in Europe and the United 
States between the seventeenth century and the nineteenth century, assumes a re-
ciprocal relationship between the tax-paying citizens and the recipient of taxes (i.e. 
the state). In short, in their search for additional resources, the European monar-
chies were prepared to share their up-to-that-point absolute political power with 
other societal actors. Political scientists consider this historical conflict to have 
laid the foundations for representative institutions, which ultimately ensured that 
 taxes received would later be appropriately distributed and used by the crown (Ross 
2004). 
Following the increase in fees or, at the latest, the introduction of new taxes, 
the Gulf monarchies – which have historically relied on a mix of religious and tradi-
tional legitimacy, on the one hand, and the distribution of state welfare benefits, on 
the other – must at some point also face this new reciprocity. It will be interesting 
to see which solutions the governments of the GCC member states use in the future 
to make a case to their citizens about the benefit of taxation. The expectation that 
   8    GIGA FoCUS | MIDDlE EAST | No. 3 | JUNE 2017 
new representative institutions (e.g. parliaments) that limit the power of the rul-
ing families will be established, or that the rights of existing advisory bodies will 
be extended is, however, unrealistic. None of the Gulf monarchs have any serious 
interest in relinquishing or sharing power. The fiscal plight in those states is not yet 
severe enough to make it necessary for their authoritarian rulers to grant political 
concessions to other societal actors in exchange for resources. [2]
of greater interest are the debates about old and new forms of governance ser-
vices [3] within the GCC. In this context, a number of interesting observations can 
be made, which provide evidence about how the Gulf rulers may attempt to legiti-
mise greater taxation of their societies. Three elements stand out:
 • emphasis on the improvement of traditional public services through greater 
digitalisation and the containment of corruption and cronyism
 • accentuation of the government’s achievements in protecting against external 
threats through friend–foe schemes (e.g. the already advanced polarisation of 
political discourse in Bahrain and the expansion of anti-Iranian propaganda by 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE) 
 • the targeted construction of global recognition, on the one hand, and country 
specific exclusivity through a ruling family–dominated state (e.g. in the UAE, 
Qatar, and to a lesser degree Bahrain this was created by, for instance, luxuri-
ous and globally advertised urban development, the holding of mega-events, 
and almost completely visa-free global mobility).
Limited Opportunities to Influence for the G20
Due to its role as host of the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, Germany will have 
a key role in recognising and evaluating the importance of GCC states (Narlikar 
2017). However, the G20’s opportunities to influence the numerous and far-reach-
ing reforms planned for the Gulf monarchies will be limited, especially since the 
common approach of the 20 most important industrialised and emerging countries 
concentrates on very few general points where structural adjustment and tax re-
form issues are concerned. However, courting the authoritarian Gulf monarchies, 
as demonstrated by President Donald Trump during his recent visit to Riyadh, is 
inappropriate and also counterproductive for the stable development of the Gulf 
region. Thus within the framework of the G20 summit, it should be made clear that 
the pending reforms must satisfy two important requirements. First, they must ob-
serve global standards of religious, ethnic, and sexual tolerance; universal human 
rights; and the freedom of speech and of the press. In this regard, however, the few 
reports on the current approach of the Saudi security forces in Awamiyah, a village 
inhabited predominantly by Shiites in the eastern Saudi province of Al-Qatif, are 
extremely alarming. Should evidence of human rights or international law viola-
tions in relation to the situation there become available before the G20 summit 
commences in Hamburg in July 2017, it must be addressed by the host nation Ger-
many. Despite Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance, the following important issues 
have to be raised: shortcomings made public by non-governmental organisations 
in the area of human rights and press freedom domestically as well as war crimes 
carried out by Saudi forces and confederates in Yemen. 
2 For historical reasons, 
Kuwait is an exception. 
It has a freely elected 
parliament, which through 
votes of no confidence can 
topple the emir-appointed 
government.
3 Following standard 
conventions, governance 
services can be described 
as the government's provi-
sion of collective goods.
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Second, a renegotiation of globalisation can only take place once all powers 
in every world region are adequately involved. Thus, in the Middle East it is both 
sensible and necessary to establish a cooperation with Iran. Black-and-white ap-
proaches will not be conducive to achieving goals in this context; on the contrary, 
they would be counterproductive in the medium term and long term. Therefore, it 
is important that G20 members make it clear to their fellow member Saudi Arabia 
that a true regional power – alongside military and economic strength – must first 
and foremost set a normative and institutional agenda that is capable of having an 
integrative effect on all relevant powers in the region (Richter 2014). If cooperative 
interaction in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran cannot be worked 
out, a new level of military escalation with far-reaching political and global eco-
nomic consequences threatens (Heibach 2017). Due to the key strategic position of 
the Gulf States to the global economy – the central trade routes between Asia and 
Europe pass through the region – a heightening of tensions in the Gulf would only 
negatively influence a reform of globalisation. 
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